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Abstract
According to the Taylor principle a central bank should adjust the nomi-
nal interest rate by more than one for one in response to changes in current
inﬂation. Most of the existing literature supports the view that by following
this simple recommendation a central bank can avoid being a source of unnec-
essary ﬂuctuations in economic activity. The present paper shows that this
conclusion is not robust with respect to the modelling of capital accumulation.
We use our insights to discuss the desirability of alternative arrangements for
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11 Introduction
According to the Taylor principle a central bank should follow an active monetary
policy, i.e. it should adjust the nominal interest rate by more than one for one in re-
sponse to changes in current inﬂation. Simple interest rate rules consistent with that
recommendation guarantee determinacy, i.e. local uniqueness of rational expecta-
tions equilibrium (REE), in many dynamic New-Keynesian (DNK) models.1 Given
its apparent robustness Clarida et al. (2000), and a large subsequent literature, use
the Taylor principle to judge the conduct of monetary policy in practice.
In the present paper we reassess the usefulness of the Taylor principle. Our
model features Calvo pricing, combined with ﬁrm-speciﬁc capital, i.e. we assume a
convex capital adjustment cost at the ﬁrm level. This set of assumptions has been
originally proposed in Woodford (2003, Ch. 5).2 Surprisingly, we ﬁnd that an active
monetary policy is not as u !cient condition for determinacy. This is interesting
because most of the existing literature supports the view that the Taylor principle
is robust with respect to the modelling of capital accumulation. An exception is
Dupor (2001). His result that a passive interest rate rule is required to guarantee
determinacy appears, however, to be speciﬁc to the continuous time framework he
employs. In a discrete-time model Galí et al. (2004) ﬁnd that it is not endogenous
capital per se that challenges the Taylor principle.3
How is it possible that we reach a dierent conclusion in the present paper?
The answer is that the convenient and widely used rental market assumption is not
1See, e.g., Taylor (1999a) and Woodford (2001).
2Sveen and Weinke (2003, 2004a,b) explain the economic mechanism through which ﬁrm-speciﬁc
capital aects inﬂation dynamics in the Calvo model. The latter has been obsured by a conceptual
mistake in Woodford (2003, Ch. 5), as we note. Since we wrote and circulated our papers there
have been other contributions that stress the fruitfulness of assuming ﬁrm-speciﬁc capital in a
model with staggered price setting. See, e.g., Altig et al. (2004), Eichenbaum and Fisher (2004),
and Woodford (2004).
3Lubik (2003) obtains a similar result. He ﬁnds that determinacy obtains under an active mon-
etary policy, if conventional values are assigned to both the capital adjustment cost and the price
stickiness parameter. His results are, however, extremely sensitive with respect to the choice of the
capital adjustment cost parameter. Carlstrom and Fuerst (2003) ﬁnd that forward-looking interest
rate rules do generally not guarantee determinacy in a DNK model with capital accumulation.
They do not challenge, however, the usefulness of the Taylor principle.
2innocuous: it hides an indeterminacy problem. The intuition is as follows. Current
investment increases current marginal cost, but it lowers marginal cost in the future.
A central bank that follows the Taylor principle therefore tends to decrease future
real interest rates in the aftermath of an investment boom. Hence, to the extent
that investment is forward-looking, the expectation of such a boom could potentially
become self-fulﬁlling. Whether this possibility materializes or not depends on the
degree of price stickiness. The higher the price stickiness the more likely it is that
the expectation of an investment boom is self-fulﬁlling, as we will discuss. The last
aspect is crucial for the fact that the rental market assumption hides an indetermi-
nacy problem. As we show in Sveen and Weinke (2004b) the dierence between a
speciﬁcation with ﬁrm-speciﬁc capital and an alternative formulation with a rental
m a r k e tb o i l sd o w nt oad i erence in eective price stickiness:4 price setters are rel-
atively more reluctant to change their prices if the capital stock at the ﬁrm level is
predetermined, i.e. for any given exogenous restriction on price adjustment there is
less price stickiness, if a rental market for capital is assumed.5 Assuming a rental
market for capital is therefore not innocuous in a model with staggered price setting:
the resulting price stickiness will generally be too low to make the indeterminacy
issue appear to be relevant from a practical point of view.6 This conclusion changes
dramatically, if capital is assumed to be ﬁrm-speciﬁc. Indeed, in the present paper,
we ﬁnd that the Taylor principle is a poor guide for the conduct of monetary policy,
once investment decisions are modelled at the ﬁrm level.
Moreover, we ﬁnd that the conditions for determinacy are much more likely to
be satisﬁed, if the central bank reacts not only to inﬂation but also to some measure
4The dierence in implied price stickiness is therefore a useful metric: Sveen and Weinke (2004b)
show that, for a standard calibration of the two models, one needs a Calvo parameter of about 0=9
in the rental market model in order to obtain the equilibrium dynamics resulting form a value of
0=75 in the model with ﬁrm-speciﬁc capital.
5The intuition is analog to the one that explains the dierence in implied inﬂation dynamics
resulting from assuming either constant returns to scale or decreasing returns to scale in a DNK
model, along the lines discussed in Sbordone (2002) and Galí et al. (2001).
6Carlstrom and Fuerst (2003) note that ‘if prices are extremely sticky’ the Taylor principle is
no longer su!cient for determinacy.
3of economic activity. In other words, a central bank could potentially become a
source of unnecessary economic ﬂuctuations if it were to follow a rule according to
which the nominal interest rate is set as a function of inﬂation only. The last result
amends a recent ﬁnding by Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2004) with a caveat. They
study the welfare properties of alternative interest rate rules across a rich variety
of DNK models. Using a second order approximation they argue that responding
to output is costly in welfare terms. However, based on our results we make the
case for interest rate rules prescribing that the central bank should react to some
measure of economic activity.7
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 outlines the model
structure with ﬁrm-speciﬁc capital and explains how it changes under the alternative
assumption of a rental market. Section 3 presents our results. We explain why
the modeling of an investment decision at the ﬁrm level changes the determinacy
properties of a DNK model so dramatically. Next it is shown that our ﬁndings are
robust with respect to changes in the relevant structural parameters. Finally, we
use our framework to discuss the desirability of alternative arrangements for the
conduct of monetary policy. Section 4 concludes.
2T h e M o d e l
The economy is populated by households and ﬁrms. In what follows we reconsider
the model with ﬁrm-speciﬁc capital outlined in Sveen and Weinke (2004a).8 In the
present paper we assume, however, that there is no aggregate uncertainty except for
sunspots according to which economic agents agree on a particular equilibrium. A
short description of the rental market case is left for the last paragraph.
7It should be noted that the analysis in Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2004) does not imply that
it would be costly in welfare terms to respond to some output gap measure. However, it is unclear
ap r i o r ihow natural output should be deﬁned in a model with endogenous capital, as discussed in
Woodford (2003, Ch. 5).
8In Sveen and Weinke (2004a) we solve the model using an iterative procedure. In the present
paper we follow Woodford (2004) and use the method of undetermined coe!cients, which is com-
putationally more e!cient. See the Appendix for an outline of Woodford’s solution.
42.1 Households





nX (Fw+n>Q w+n)> (1)
where X (·) denotes the period utility function,  is a discount factor, Qw denotes











where % is the elasticity of substitution between dierent varieties of goods Fw (l).












Parameter  denotes the household’s relative risk aversion, or equivalently, the in-
verse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, and parameter ! can be in-
terpreted as the the inverse of the Frisch labor supply elasticity. Moreover, the
household is assumed to supply labor in a competitive market.
The maximization is subject to the following sequence of budget constraints:
Z 1
0
Sw (l)Fw (l)gl + Hw {Tw>w+1Gw+1}  Gw + ZwQw + Ww> (4)
where Zw is the time w nominal wage, Tw>w+1 is the stochastic discount factor for
random nominal payments, Gw+1 is the nominal payo of the portfolio held at the
end of period w,a n dWw denotes proﬁts resulting from ownership of ﬁrms.
















denotes the price index. It has the property that
the minimum expenditure required to purchase a bundle of goods resulting in Fw
units of the composite good is given by SwFw.



















The ﬁrst equation is the optimality condition for labor supply, and the second one
is a standard intertemporal optimality condition. Finally, let us note that the time
w gross nominal interest rate, Uw, is related to the stochastic discount factor by the
equilibrium condition U
31
w = Hw {Tw>w+1}.
2.2 Firms
There is a continuum of monopolistically competitive ﬁrms, indexed on the unit




where  is the capital share in the production function, and Nw (l) and Qw (l) denote,
respectively, ﬁrm l’s capital stock and labor input used in its period w production
denoted \w (l).
We assume staggered price setting à la Calvo (1983), i.e. each ﬁrm faces a
constant and exogenous probability, , of getting to reoptimize its price in any given
period. This structure implies that ﬁrm l’s nominal price, Sw (l),i se i t h e rt h eo n e
that was posted the period before or the optimally chosen price SW
w (l).
Moreover, we follow Woodford (2003, Ch. 5) in assuming two restrictions on
6capital adjustment. First, the additional capital resulting from an investment deci-
sion becomes productive with a one period delay. Second, ﬁrms face a convex capital







where Lw (l) denotes the amount of the composite good11 purchased by ﬁrm l at
time w,a n dNw (l) denotes this ﬁrm’s capital stock as of that period. Moreover,
function L(·) is assumed to satisfy the following: L(1) = , L0(1) = 1,a n dL00(1) =
#.P a r a m e t e r  denotes the depreciation rate. Eichenbaum and Fisher (2004)
interpret parameter # as the elasticity of the investment to capital ratio with respect
to Tobin’s q, evaluated in steady state. Parameter # is assumed to be strictly
larger than zero and it measures the convex capital adjustment cost in a log-linear
approximation to the equilibrium dynamics.
Cost minimization by ﬁrms and households implies that demand for each indi-












w denotes aggregate demand at time w,w h i c hi sg i v e nb y :
\
g
w  Fw + Lw>
and Lw 
R 1
0 Lw (l)gl denotes aggregate investment demand.
Let us now consider a price setter’s problem. Given its time w capital stock, Nw (l),






10Sveen and Weinke (2003) consider a model with just the ﬁrst restriction on a ﬁrm’s capital
accumulation, namely the one period delay.
11The elasticity of substitution, %, is assumed to be the same as in the consumption aggregate.








































w+n+1(l) with prob. (1  )
Sw+n(l) with prob. 
Aﬁ r mm that is restricted to change its price at time w solves the same problem,
e x c e p tf o rt h ef a c tt h a ti tt a k e sSw(m) as given.













where PVw+1(l) denotes the nominal reduction in ﬁrm l’s labor cost associated with
having one additional unit of capital in place in period w+1. The only non-standard
feature of the last equation is that the marginal return to capital is not measured
by the nominal marginal revenue product of capital, but instead by PVw+1(l).T h e
reason is that ﬁrms are demand constrained, as discussed in Woodford (Ch. 5, 2003).





where PSNw (l) and PSOw (l) denote, respectively, the marginal product of capital
and labor of ﬁrm l in period w.










w (l)  PFw+n (l)]
ª
=0 > (14)
where   %
%31 denotes the frictionless mark-up over marginal costs, and PFw (l)





Equation (14) reﬂects the forward-looking nature of price setting: ﬁrms take into
account not only current but also future expected marginal costs in those states of
t h ew o r l dw h e r et h ec h o s e np r i c ei ss t i l lp o s t e d .
2.3 Market Clearing












w (l) denotes time w investment demand for good l.
2.4 Some Linearized Equilibrium Conditions
We restrict attention to a linear approximation around a steady state with zero
inﬂation. Throughout, a hat on a variable denotes the percent deviation of the
original variable with respect to its steady state value.
92.4.1 Households
Solving the household’s problem results in an Euler equation and in a labor supply
equation. They read, respectively:
b Fw = Hw b Fw+1 
1






= ! b Qw +  b Fw> (19)








Law of Motion of Capital Aggregating and log-linearizing the ﬁrst order con-
dition for investment (12) and combining the resulting expression with the Euler







Hw b Nw+2 (20)
+
1  (1  )
# (1 + )
Hwc pvw+1 
1
# (1 + )
(lw  Hww+1  )>
where Nw 
R 1




denotes the average real marginal return to capital.
Inﬂation equation We follow Woodford (2004) and derive the inﬂation equation
by employing the method of undetermined coe!cients. He shows that it takes the
following simple form:
w = Hww+1 +  c pfw> (21)




is the average real marginal cost.
10Production function Aggregating and log-linearizing the production functions
of individual ﬁrms (8) results in:
b \w =  b Nw +( 1 ) b Qw= (22)
where \w i sa g g r e g a t ep r o d u c t i o n .W eh a v eu s e dt h ef a c tt h a tw er e s t r i c ta t t e n t i o n
to a linear approximation around a steady state with zero inﬂation.
Market clearing Aggregating and log-linearizing the goods market clearing con-
dition for each variety (17), and invoking (8) and (10), we obtain:
b \w =






b Nw+1  (1  ) b Nw
i
= (23)
The last equation reﬂects the assumption that the capital adjustment cost is assumed
to be zero in steady state.
2.5 Rental Market
Now we assume that households accumulate the capital stock and rent it to ﬁrms.12
This structure implies that each ﬁrm produces at the same marginal cost which is
independent of the price posted by any individual ﬁrm. The associated inﬂation
equation reads:
w = Hww+1 + c pfw> (24)
where  
(13)(13)
 . It should be noted that the inﬂation equation is the only
structural equation that is aected by the change in assumption regarding capi-
tal accumulation. This means that, given a speciﬁcation of monetary policy, the
equilibrium processes for the nominal interest rate, consumption, real wage, capital,
output, hours, and inﬂation are determined by equations (18), (19), (20), (22), (23),
12The implied changes in the respective maximization problems of households and ﬁrms are
obvious. See, e.g., Galí (2004) et al. for a derivation of the equilibrium conditions resulting from
that set of assumptions.
11and an inﬂation equation. The latter is given by equation (21) for the ﬁrm-speciﬁc
capital model and by equation (24) for the rental market speciﬁcation.13 Next we
explore what kinds of simple interest rate rules guarantee determinacy in the two
New-Keynesian models under consideration, and why.
3R e s u l t s
3.1 Calibration
The period length is one quarter. Consistent with empirical estimates of the in-
tertemporal elasticity of substitution given by Basu and Kimball (2003) we assume
 =2 . We set ! =1 , implying a unit labor supply elasticity. We assign a standard
value of 0=36 to the capital share in the production function, . Setting  =0 =99
implies an average annual real return of about 4 percent. We choose % =1 1implying
a frictionless markup of 10 percent, which is in line with the empirical estimate in
Galí et al. (2001). Finally, we set # =3 , as proposed by Woodford (2003, Ch. 5).
3.2 A Simple Interest Rate Rule
Our starting point is a simple interest rate rule according to which the nominal
interest rate is set as a function of current inﬂation:
lw =  + w= (25)
W ea s kw h a tc o m b i n a t i o n so fv a l u e sf o rt h ei n ﬂ a t i o nr e s p o n s ec o e !cient, ,a n d
the price stickiness parameter, , result in a determinate equilibrium. The result is
shown in Figure 1 for the model with ﬁrm-speciﬁc capital: a large range of para-
meter values that meet the Taylor principle are inconsistent with determinacy. In
13To solve the dynamic stochastic system of equations we use Dynare
(http://www.cepremap.cnrs.fr/dynare/). Thanks to Larry Christiano for providing us with
M a t l a bc o d ew h i c hw eh a v eu s e di nt h ec o m p u t a t i o no f.
12particular, for reasonable calibrations of the price stickiness parameter we obtain
an apparently counterintuitive result: an inﬂation response coe!cient, , strictly
larger than one is necessary but not su!cient for determinacy. For response coe!-
cients in that range REE is determinate only if the central bank adjusts the nominal
interest rate either very gently or very aggressively.14 Next we develop the intuition
behind these results.




















Let us start by conducting a thought experiment: suppose a sunspot hits the
economy and ﬁrms increase their investment spending without any change in the
economy’s fundamentals justifying it. Could this investment boom be potentially
consistent with equilibrium? The answer is yes and the reason is simple. Investment
has counteracting eects on the determination of the marginal cost. It increases cur-
rent marginal cost but it reduces marginal cost in subsequent periods. The resulting
inﬂation dynamics inherit the U-shaped marginal cost pattern. In particular, there
will be some period of deﬂation in the aftermath of the investment boom. To the
extent that the central bank follows the Taylor principle, the associated real inter-
14The indeterminacy region associated with the case where the Taylor principle is met does not
lend itself for a simulation of the sunspot since the order of indeterminacy is two. For a discussion
of the last point see Galí (1997) and the references herein.
13est rate will therefore drop, for some time. The latter could potentially dominate
the long real interest rate relevant for investment. If this happens, then it may
rationalize the investment boom ex post.
Whether this possibility materializes, or not, depends on both the price stickiness
parameter and the inﬂation response coe!cient, as shown in Figure 1. Let us develop
the intuition. First, we note that some price stickiness is needed for the above
reasoning to make sense: if prices were assumed to be ﬂexible then the real marginal
cost would be constant. Indeed, a price stickiness parameter, ,o fa b o u t0=63 is
needed to obtain indeterminacy under an interest rate rule that respects the Taylor
principle. This value corresponds to an average lifetime of a price of less than 3
quarters. Of course, the exact extent to which prices are sticky in actual economies
remains controversial.15 However, a value of  as high as 0=75 is often considered to
be empirically plausible. Second, we analyze the comparative statics associated with
a change in the inﬂation response coe!cient. Let us assume that price stickiness is
such that the Taylor principle does not guarantee determinacy and consider three
alternative arrangements for the conduct of monetary policy. In each of them the
inﬂation response coe!cient is assumed to be strictly larger than one implying that
the Taylor principle is satisﬁed. The three rules dier, however, in the assumed
aggressiveness of monetary policy. We consider a weak case (a), an intermediate
case (b) and an aggressive case (c), as measured by the relative size of the respective
inﬂation response coe!cients. Consider case (a) (the weak case) and suppose that
there is a drop in the relevant long real interest rate along the lines outlined above.
Under the maintained assumption regarding the conduct of monetary policy the
resulting decrease in the long real interest rate will not be large enough to justify
the investment boom ex post. As a result, REE is determinate. This is dierent in
c a s e( b )( t h ei n t e r m e d i a t ec a s e ) .As u !ciently large response parameter implies a
decrease in the long real rate that is large enough to justify the investment boom
15The micro evidence in Golosov and Lucas (2003) suggests that ﬁrms change prices more fre-
quently than every 2 quarters, while 4 quarters appear to be plausible based on Taylor (1999b).
14ex post. This means that REE is indeterminate. The situation changes again in
case (c) (the aggressive case). We observe that the central bank is more eective in
reducing future deﬂation than in reducing current inﬂation. The reason is that an
increase in the response parameter decreases future deﬂation, which in itself tends
to increase current inﬂation. Hence, if monetary policy is su!ciently aggressive and
future expected deﬂation is small, then the relevant long real interest rate must
increase rather than decrease. As a result, REE is determinate.

















As we have argued, forward-looking price setting is one key economic mechanism
behind our result that the Taylor principle is a poor guide for the design of monetary
policy rules. Indeed, to the extent that a rental market for capital is assumed
price setting is not forward-looking enough to imply indeterminacy, unless extreme
assumptions regarding the frequency of price adjustments are made. This is shown
in Figure 2. These ﬁndings are consistent with those reported by Carlstrom and
Fuerst (2003).
In summary, abstracting from capital accumulation, i.e. considering only con-
sumption demand, which does not produce any counteracting eects for the deter-
mination of the marginal cost, or using the rental market assumption, which reduces
15the eective price stickiness in the model, obscures the fact that the Taylor principle
is not a useful guide for the design of monetary policy. What form should simple
interest rate rules then take in order to prevent the central bank from becoming a
source of macroeconomic instability?
3.3 The Importance of Responding to Economic Activity
It is natural to consider next the determinacy regions associated with an interest
rate rule that allows for an output response:
lw =  + ||w + w= (26)























The result is shown in Figure 3. A relatively small size of the output response
coe!cient is enough to reduce dramatically the importance of the indeterminacy
issue. The intuition is as follows: an investment boom increases current output.
If the central bank reacts with its interest rate instrument directly to this, then
chances are much smaller that the impact of current investment spending on future
marginal cost leads to a monetary policy which would justify an investment boom ex
post. The last result has interesting implications for the design of monetary policy
16rules. Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2004) emphasize that reacting to output is costly
in welfare terms. This is shown for a very rich set of DNK models. We amend
their ﬁnding with a caveat: based on our analysis reacting to some measure of real
activity appears to be recommendable since it reduces the risk that the central bank
becomes a source of unnecessary ﬂuctuations in the economy. Clearly, these issues
need to be further explored by conducting a welfare analysis for a DNK model with
ﬁrm-speciﬁc investment.
4C o n c l u s i o n
According to the Taylor (1999) principle a central bank should adjust the nominal
interest rate by more than one for one in response to changes in current inﬂation.
This recommendation is generally believed to be a useful guide for the design of
monetary policy. Our main result is in stark contrast with this view. We ﬁnd that
by following the Taylor principle a central bank does not necessarily avoid becoming
a source of marcoeconomic instability. More importantly, to the extent that a central
bank adjusts the nominal interest rate only in response to inﬂation, indeterminacy
appears to be the regular case. This ﬁnding challenges much of the conventional
wisdom regarding desirable properties of interest rate rules.
Our result follows from a interaction of two economic mechanisms: forward-
lookingness in investment and in price setting. In explaining these mechanisms we
build on our earlier work where Sveen and Weinke (2003, 2004a,b) solve and discuss
models with ﬁrm-speciﬁc capital and Calvo pricing. Based on our insights we make
the case for interest rate rules prescribing that the central bank should react to
some measure of economic activity, in the spirit of the rule that has been originally
proposed by Taylor (1993).
17Appendix: Inﬂation Dynamics





w  1b nw (l)> (A1)
where 1 is an unknown parameter. He further assumes that the investment decision
of any ﬁrm m satisﬁes:
b nw+1 (m)=2b nw (m)+3b sw (m)> (A2)
where 2 and 3 are two additional unknown parameters.
Finally, he invokes the relationship between the log-linearized average newly set
price, b sW







Combined with the ﬁrst-order conditions for price setting and investment it is pos-
sible to pin down the unknown coe!cients 1, 2,a n d3 and to derive the inﬂation
equation (21), along the lines outlined in Woodford (2004).
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